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THE ROLE OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY IN AIR SAFETY
By G. I.

WHITEHEAD, JR.I

I

HAVE been asked to help tell the story of the insurance industry's
place in the business of making aviation safe. This fact, that insurers
have a role on the safety-side of aeronautics, may come as a novel idea
to those, and no doubt there are some, who think that insurers have no
particular interest in safety. After all, no matter how irresponsible the
risk, there seems to be a market somewhere that will take it at a price
and if things get too rough, there is always cancellation. Don't you believe
it! The range of activity for professional aviation insurance underwriters
in the safety field may have some practical limitations, but this activity is,
nevertheless, effective and important. This is so in part at least, to put it
candidly, because insurers' interest in safety is not completely unselfish.
Experience from which successful underwriting is measured is not just a
matter of good or bad fortune. It is the end product of many management
operations including loss control, i.e., safety engineering, a claims administration prompt to accept and pay honest claims but also alert to investigate,
reject and successfully resist exaggerated and dishonest demands, and finally, an efficient management team, all made necessary through competition
and the drive for a profitable operation. Loss control has a significant place
in the effort of professional aviation insurers to be right the first time in
their underwriting judgments. The forces of the market place do not often
allow second chances. If asked, however, to state the first and most important single objective of aviation insurance, the answer, clearly, has to
be to provide needed protection for risk capital invested in expanding
aviation enterprises and at rates which are fair and equitable. This promises
to be a continuing and exciting objective in the years ahead when jumbojets and supersonic transports will be traveling the world's airlanes.
Turning to the sphere of action for professional aviation insurers in
the work of making aviation safe, the areas of most effective activity might
be listed as follows, without any order of precedence:
(1) Risk selection-to insure piece of business or not;
(2) Insurance policy terms and conditions-clauses relating to aircraft airworthiness, purposes of use and approved pilots;
(3) Safety engineering-inspection of the insured property and
operations; and
(4) Safety programs and support, active and financial, of similar
industrywide programs.
In addition to the obligation to pay, insurers have a right and duty to
defend, and consequently, the tort system, its present and future, is of
t Vice President, United States Aviation Underwriters Inc., New York, New York.
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great interest to professional aviation underwriters. Therefore the substance, at least, of the problem will be suggested in the space available at
the end of this paper and may be stated as: The Tort System-its role, if
any, in producing safer airplanes and safer air travel.
Taken in its broadest sense the expression loss control does include decisions relating to whether the business should be underwritten in the first
place and at what price. Therefore risk selection has been included in this
paper for limited discussion. Critical investigation and evaluation of the
basic, technical expertness of a prospective insured to perform in its field
is a necessary part of the selective underwriting process. This is not an
elaborate problem where the risk under consideration is a large manufacturer or scheduled air carrier either with a well-known reputation in the
industry or one that can be quickly and reliably investigated through a
number of sources. It would be a great act of effrontery to attempt to tell
these folks how to build a safe airplane and how to run a safe airline. The
fact probably is that the underwriter is pleased to have the opportunity to
consider the risk and submit a competitive quote for the business. Risk
selection does, however, play a part in aviation safety when insurers are
asked to underwrite a marginal or sub-standard risk which is in that
category only because company officials failed to recognize their loss management problems. The decision to underwrite such risks may be made
after investigation and evaluation, usually an on-the-premises study of the
risk with the complete backing and cooperation of management, and when
a review of the study shows that its implementation will greatly enhance
the prospects for controllable exposures to loss. The insured must, of course,
agree to give practical effect to the recommendations as the inescapable
prerequisite to the binding of insurance coverage. Studies have, for example,
included insistence upon the employment of a staff safety engineer with
appropriate authority in the chain of corporate command so that his reports and recommendations will have attention and action.
Another useful and important illustration is when the underwriting
study of a prospective risk discloses that an otherwise intelligent and
knowledgeable management is treating its corporate aviation department
as a sort of special group free to operate outside normal supervisory systems established for other seemingly more commonplace corporate activities. There is no flight operations manual; no supervised system for pilot
selection and continued training, keeping current and up-rating through
a ground school and flight check program; no systematic maintenance and
flight scheduling for maximum utilization of corporate aircraft; and no
chain of responsibility to a top executive. A little thought simply to exercise ordinary management supervision, setting up reasonable standards and
procedures and a control to make sure they are accomplished, will correct
a dangerous situation and provide aviation insurers with a desirable risk.
The main thrust of accident studies, especially the broad studies being
made of automobile accidents, is toward reducing the physical effect on
victims, making them more comfortable in the accidents that do occur,

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[ Vol. 3 4

and to provide those injured with adequate and certain compensation. There
are people who strongly urge that any restrictions which have the effect of
reducing victims' chances of recovering money damages to something less
than certain should be eliminated. There are such restrictions in a contract
of aircraft liability insurance. It is a two-way street. Insurer and insured
have obligations each agrees to perform. Also, certain conditions to be
met by an insured are specific exclusions, the subject matter of which
directly relates to flying safety and for the breach of which coverage would
be excluded. Some find a contradiction here. A three-way disagreement
arises between those who insist upon certain compensation for victims of
accidents, those who assert that most policy coverage disputes should be
resolved in favor of the insured and those who urge that the penalty of
exposure to an uninsured loss when a policy condition is breached, particularly in the area of aircraft certification and use and pilot certification
and experience, is a potent tool for the flying safety kit. "Isn't there something you fellows can do about refusing to provide insurance for crassly
foolish pilots and ground them," bitterly asks the state aviation official
who has just returned from the scene of an especially bad general aviation
accident where all on board were killed because of a stupid act. The divergence of opinion is emphasized in the office of another state official where
work is going ahead on a bill which would make aircraft liability insurance
compulsory and prohibit the use of safety exclusions so that in all events
the pilot's estate will have insurance protection and there will be funds
available to the policy limit requirements from which to pay judgments.
The problem is posed sharply by the Civil Aeronautics Board's proposed
rule making with respect to air taxi operators. A new rule would, among
other things, require compulsory aircraft liability insurance and broadly
prohibit exclusions of coverage for violations of safety or economic rules
and requirements. The government's responsibility is to promote air safety.
The proposed requirements for air taxi operators are, according to the
Board, "needed in order to protect the public's right to recover for losses
incurred in accidents in which these carriers are involved." The proposed
amendment to the economic regulations obviously makes no contribution
to the prevention of accidents; the insurance policy exclusions the rule
would eliminate clearly do. No one can seriously object to compulsory
insurance requirements for commercial operators in the business of carrying passengers for hire. One can, however, question the judgment behind
the proposal to eliminate insurance policy provisions which require the
insured to meet minimum standards of performance. This is something
which deserves careful examination beyond the scope of this paper. In
urging the case for safety exclusions, it is difficult for insurers to be detached and impartial. They are not. The three W's for a successful aircraft
liability insurance underwriter are: WHO is flying WHAT airplane
WHERE? These are the safety exclusions relating to pilot certification and
experience, licensing of aircraft and the purposes for which the aircraft
will be used within designated territorial limits. These exclusions are in
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harmony with the charge on the government to foster accident prevention
and give support to the government in areas of private and commercial
flying where present government regulation and enforcement are necessarily restricted. Most aviation people are prudent operators who, early
in their careers, put into practice the warning in the expression: "There
may be old pilots and bold pilots, but there are no old, bold pilots." There
are, nevertheless, others who are marginal operators, under-capitalized
and below minimum standards in operation. These people will, the records
show, perform to acceptable standards, in most instances, if required to by
the terms and conditions of an insurance policy when the option is exposure
to uninsured losses. Human nature being what it is, they will do no more
than demanded of them. It is disappointing that the rule makers cannot
see the promise of mischief in their proposal; that the public may, in fact,
be getting the short end of the stick. The proposed rule making only distracts from the real problem which is preventing accidents in the first
place.
When accidents occur, insurers will, as necessary to carry out their
rights and responsibilities relating to investigation and defense, consult with
and retain technical people whose special knowledge and experience is required in the circumstances of a particular accident. These investigations
can, and frequently do, lead insurers down complicated technological
paths. Nevertheless, no one should know the product better than the folks
who design and build it. No one should know flying better than those who
have had a life-time of intimate experience planning, conducting and
managing flight operations. Moreover, the state of the art has advanced
to where it is not feasible for insurers to attempt routinely to judge engineering and operational conclusions on the frontiers! of industry knowledge.
In all events, it seems a reasonable expectation that an insured's reputation
for quality of performance and product must be maintained as a matter
of first importance; this is a constant effort and necessarily requires keeping abreast of the times, or better, in state of the art developments including those that will make transportation by air safer. What part then does
safety-engineering have in underwriting the risks of aviation?
Safety-engineering is essentially a matter of constructive cooperation
between insured and insurer to prevent accidents by anticipating, and
eliminating, their causes. The objective is loss control. The liability of
insurers to injured third parties stemming from their alleged reliance upon
safety inspections has been much in the legal news in recent years to the
dismay of the insurance industry. Insurers are candid enough to suggest
that safety-engineering is not an altruistic service; the benefit to the public
generally is an incidental by-product of the millions of dollars spent each
year to reduce risks covered under insurance policies. The current insurance policy condition with respect to safety engineering inspections establishes the right and intent in the following language:
The Company or the Aviation Managers shall be permitted but not obligated to inspect the Named Insured's property and operations at any time.
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Neither the Company's right to make inspections nor the making thereof
nor any report thereon shall constitute an undertaking, on behalf of or for
the benefit of the Named Insured of others, to determine or warrant that
such property or operations are safe.
Thus the insurance industry hopes a solution has been found to the decisions where the permissive inspection clause has imposed liability on the
insurer to third parties.
A transport aircraft was destroyed by fire while being refueled. The
facts of the accident are quite simple. A refueling hose burst spraying
gasoline on the refueling pump powered by an air-cooled engine, the
source of ignition. A good decision to move the truck quickly from the
vicinity of the aircraft became a bad decision when the service people
neglected first to remove the refueling hose nozzel from the filler neck.
Consequently the nozzle was forcibly pulled from the filler neck bathing
the wing in gasoline. Subsequent investigation developed that no reliable
records existed from which to establish when and from whom the ruptured
hose was purchased and how long it had been in service. Similarly, no
accurate records were kept on any refueling hoses whether in use or in
stock. Some protection against fuel reaching the refueling pump was
provided by removable steel plates shielding each side of the engine. The
driver had neglected to insert the plates on the day of the accident. Investigation in depth of the premises and operation revealed that these were
not isolated instances of deficiency.
A loading stand collapsed pitching a deplaning passenger to the concrete ramp below. He could not move. Insurers had a paraplegic to contend with. The ramp service company was a new risk for the insurers, and
therefore a safety engineering survey was immediately requested by the
underwriter. Scheduling difficulties caused delay in getting a safety engineer on the premises. In the meantime the accident had occurred. The
cause of the stand's collapse was traced to some simple mechanical linkage
and the selection of lubricants.
These omissions to perform illustrate the obvious: the aims and methods
of safety engineering involve more than a once-over-lightly visit to the
premises and inspections must be dealt with urgently. The illustrations also
emphasize that conspicuous failures are long remembered. There are untold and unheralded numbers of instances where safety-engineers have
proposed courses and offered counsel to insureds that have paid off by
measurably reducing the frequency of accidents and keeping the serious
loss from happening. Safety-engineering people are continually making
safety presentations, many regularly scheduled, to all levels of an insured's
staff. The weight is, admittedly, on safety in premises operations, escalators,
elevators, good industrial housekeeping, providing a safe place for invitees
who are on the premises in acordance with the invitation and providing a
safe place for employees to work.
In the safety-in-flight area the Flight Safety Foundation is the center
of action for the private sector. This organization deserves, and has, the
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support of professional aviation underwriters. Much remains to be done,
however, and must be done, to spread the gospel of safety to general
aviation pilots. The Flight Safety Foundation and others are doing a good
job to circulate the story of accidents and their prevention in safety bulletins and pamphlets. Professional aviation insurers, too, disseminate much
safety literature each year. Nevertheless, in dreary and morbid repetition,
accident reports are received of pilots with marginal training and experience flying too much airplane on trips to the edge of, or beyond, their
competence. And in another category of accident, what compels a guy
to attempt to takeoff downwind on a short uphill runway with temperatures in the 70's, maximum load, including his wife and relatives as
passengers, and for his last words alive on earth says, "Oh! Oh! We're not
going to make it." Federal Aviation Agency statistical reviews tell how
much of this sort of thing exists. The sad fact is that no one has fiigured
out how to deal with the problem. To avoid lessons from the harsh teacher,
experience, the painless and least expensive route is learning through the
misfortunes of others. A seemingly obvious point but one that obviously,
too, requires re-emphasis. This is, of course, what safety programs are all
about.
The following appears in a bulletin reporting general strategies and
techniques suggested to members of the plaintiffs' bar at various seminars
and conventions:
The general theme of the plaintiffs' attorney in a Products Liability
case should be that he is promoting safety and that the jury, as the
voice of the community, can bring in a verdict which will encourage
the safe manufacture of products.
This requires little comment. It is a play on the theme "Sue for Safety,"
a catchword coined by lawyers who regularly appear on the plaintiffs' side
of damage suits. At the least it is a gimmick; at the most, it is a technique.
The tort system for administering justice in civil cases is an adversary
proceeding, sometimes called a competition in persuasion, first, to fix
responsibility for the accident and second, to assess damages. Punishment,
deterrence and enforcement do not belong in a tort action. In appropriate
circumstances there are administrative proceedings in which fines may be
imposed for certain violations and licenses revoked or suspended. If there
has been a violation of the law, criminal penalties may also attach. An
attempt is made to urge that the worrisome burden imposed upon defendants through discovery and inspection, in particular bringing out ghastly
errors of commission and omission through deposing the alleged culprits, is
a great and lasting warning to them. The simple truth is that by the time
the lawsuit reaches the deposition stage, the defendant knows all the bad
news, if there is any to know, and corrective measures, as necessary, have
been taken. In most instances, a case continues to be litigated and gets
into the discovery and inspection phase because agreement cannot be
reached on the issue of value, and, therefore, the lawsuit is tried on all issues.
The alleged culprits who are grilled for days on depositions in a case where
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the jury comes in with a "not guilty" verdict for their defendant employer
will probably have a great and lasting impression that negligence litigation
is a rotten system; that there must be a better way to compensate victims
of accidents.
The statement made at a recent panel discussion: "that if you would
hit them in the pocketbook, you would make them build safer aircraft" is
irresponsible nonsense. For a manufacturer to survive in the marketplace,
his product has to be reliable. In addition to the forces of competition,
federal rules and regulations prescribe minimum standards for design and
materials. And, finally, if tort litigation were in the nature of a penalty
proceeding, the wide use of insurance to defend and pay the costs of defense
and to cushion the impact of money judgments frustrates such a purpose.
Reflective of an attitude that is difficult to answer without dignifying
it, a moderator opened the discussion of the effect of litigation on safety
by saying: "Now, assume the manufacturer is a businessman and, therefore, will foist off on the general public an inferior product, if he can .... "
This is shabby stuff. Although exchanges should be encouraged between
those on all sides of an issue, similar to the mixture of interests of those
participating in this symposium, it is sometimes fruitless to attempt to
rectify misconceptions stemming from glaring bias. Most businessmen, as
most lawyers, are decent folks trying to do their jobs well. Most people
know far less about business than its importance in our society makes
appropriate.
If the tort system fails to provide the parties to aviation accident litigation, plaintiff and defendant, substantial and equal justice with reasonable
dispatch, new proposals will come in one way or another as they have in
the automobile accident field. The fault system of disposing of liability
claims has been referred to as "one of the enduring values of our legal
system." One major danger to it lies with those who would substitute
"social justice" for "equal justice."

